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NOTES AND COMMENTTS

this evidence was found sufficient to prove the defendant received the
goods. Since proof of the element of receiving has seldom been questioned in this jurisdiction, the court has not had an opportunity to express itself fully upon this subject. However, in view of past decisions,
it would seem that at least in the present case, there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to determine whether the defendant had received
the goods.
There was no direct evidence in. the case that the defendant received
the stolen goods with a felonious intent. This left only the question of
whether the circumstances under which the defendant received the goods
were such that his felonious intent might be implied. Since the presumption which arises from recent possession had no application, the
jury at most was left to conjecture whether the defeidant received the
stolen goods with a felonious intent, or received them for the purpose
of returning the goods to the rightful owner as he had promised to do.
Unquestionably these circumstances alone were not sufficient to imply
that the defendant received the goods with felonious intent, for our Court
has said, "When the act of a person may be attributed to two or more
motives, the one criminal and the other not, the humanity of our law
45
will ascertain as to that which is not criminal."
Granting that in the present case there was insufficient evidence of
felonious intent, would the Supreme Court have arrived at a different
result had the state proved that the defendant had been in possession
of the gun for sufficient length of time to have returned it to the owner ?
THoMAS A.

WADDEN,

JR.

Damages-Decereased Purchasing Value of the Dollar
As Element-Excessiveness
A federal district court recently sustained a jury verdict awarding
$160,000 to a four-year-old boy for loss of both arms' above the wrist
and elbow respectively in a personal injury action.1 A most interesting
aspect of the case is the importance attached to the decreased. purchasing
value of the dollar by the trial judge in reviewing the award on defend2
ant's motion to set aside as excessive.
Although. expressed necessarily in terms of the dollar, the value of
an award of damages is not that dollar itself, but the goods and services
it will purchase. Thus fluctuations in the purchasing value of the dollar.
should be a proper consideration in the measurement of monetary yom, State v. Massey, 86 N. C. 658 (1882).
'Armentrant v. Virginian Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S. D. W. Va. 1947).
' Id. at 101 ("In seeking to discover whether or not the jury were actuated
by any improper motives in arriving at the amount of the verdict, we should
attempt to measure the monetary value of the different elements of damage which
were proper for their consideration; bearing in mind the decreased value of the
dollar, which has come about very rapidly during the past few years.').
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pensation. What weight is to be given this factor is indefinite, most
courts merely stating it as one of the numerous factors to be considered.4
It is, of course, a product of the times, varying in importance with
changes in economic conditions, but the long-term downward trend in
the purchasing power of the dollar has been evidenced by almost constant reference by many courts over the last thirty years. 5
The determination of damages in a personal injury action is primarily the province of the jury under proper instructions of the trial
court.6 Most frequently the courts express their reluctance to interfere
by saying that to warrant such interference, the verdict must be so
excessive as to appear that it was given under the influence of passion
or prejudice, or was the result of mistake on the part of the jury.7 In
the principal case the trial judge set out all of the factors which he
thought might properly go into the jury's synthesis, 8 including an unusual adjustment for income taxes.9 After mathematically computing
these elements, he concluded that although the verdict was exceptionally
large, the jury might properly have reached such a sum. However, it
seems that the decreased purchasing value of the dollar, which in effect
combined with and inflated each of the other factors, was the prime consideration leading to his justification of the award.
As far back as 1878 a New York appellate court recognized the
changing value of the dollar as pertinent to the ascertainment of dam' Although no mention of the decreased purchasing value of the dollar was
found in the North Carolina Reports, this factor undoubtedly has had a degree of
influence through the increase in wages which normally follows the increase in
cost of living and would thus be reflected in the consideration of lost earning
capacity in the measuring of compensation. But cf. Palmer v. Security Trust

Co., 242 Mich. 163. 218 N. W. 677 (1928).

'Delaney

v. New York Cent. R. R., 68 F. Supp. 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) ; Cole

v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn. 1945); Jones v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 55 F. Supp. 17 (E. D. Pa. 1944); Ford v. Fried, 330 Ill.
App. 136, 70 N. E. 2d 626 (1947); Scott v. Claiborne Electric Cooperative,
La. App. - , 13 So. 2d 524 (1943) ; Schneller v. Louisiana State Rice
Inc., Milling Co., 148 La. 88, 86 So. 663 (1920); Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170,
,
S. C. 19 N. W. 2d 327 (1945); Bowers v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 42 S. E. 2d 705 (1947).
' A converse application of this principle has been made to decrease the award
due to an increase in the purchasing value of the dollar. Johnson v. St. Paul City
67 Minn. 260, 69 N. W. 900 (1899).
R. R.,
8
McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §16 (1935); PARMELE, DAMAGE VERDICTS 1 (1927).

7
McCoRmicx,
8

DAMAGES §18 (1935); PARMELE, DAMAGE VERDIcrs 2 (1927).

The following factors were included: pain, suffering, humiliation, permanent

disfigurement, inconvenierice and incapacity, personal service and care until the
end of maximum expectancy, and loss of earning capacity from the age of 21
until the end of maximum expectancy reduced to present worth. See McCoRMICK,
DAMAGES §§86, 88, 90 (1935).

' Income taxes were computed at the present day rates less 30010 anticipated
reduction in the near future. Thus taxes payable on estimated potential earnings
were deducted yearly and those payable on interest from the principal sum were
Tex. Civ. App. ,
added. Cf. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Dehnisch, -

57 S. W. 64 (1900). Contra: Stokes v. United States, 144 F. 2d 82 (C. C. A. 2d
1944) (too conjectural).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
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ages.
As first applied, it was limited merely to the review of damages
by the courts."' Since then it has come to be recognized as proper for
2
It
the jury to consider in reaching the verdict in the first instance.'
has been held error to instruct the jury that it must not assess damages
according to its view of the present purchasing power of the dollar. 3
Moreover, it has been held proper matter for counsel's argument to the
14
jury to set forth the increased cost of living.
Probably the most frequently invoked test of the excessiveness or
nonexcessiveness of a particular award is its compatibility with previous
awards in substantially similar factual situations.' 5 The test cannot be
applied with mathematical precision because of the many differing factors going into an award' 6 but the wide experience reflected in awards
given in similar cases is of great value as a guide to what. is reasonable
compensation in the mind of an average man." Thus a Michigan court
stated,' "A general review of the cases in which there are facts of a
somewhat similar character enables one to determine that the amount
of a verdict which does not fall within certain limitations is unjust."
" Gale v. New York C. & H. R. R., 13 Hun 1, 4 (N. Y. 1878) ("But in
making comparison of other cases with the present, we notice two things: one is
that the relative value of money has diminished in recent times; another is that,
generally, in the older parts of the country the relative value of money is less than
in the
new.").
21E.g., Louisville & N. R. R. v. Williams, 183 Ala. 136, 62 So. 679 (1913);
Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. Miller, 5 Ga. App. 402, 63 S. E. 299 (1908);
Noyes v. Des Moines Club, 186 Iowa 378, 170 N. W. 461 (1919); Dole v. New
Orleans Ry. and Light Co., 121 La. 945, 46 So. 929 (1908); Hays v. United
R. R.,
183 Mo. App. 608, 167 S. W. 656 (1914).
"2 Missouri P. R. R. v. Elvin,, 176 Ark. 737, 4 S. W. 2d 528 (1928);
Washington & R. R. Co. v. La Fourcade, 48 App. D. C. 364 (1919).
" Tennessee River Nay. Co. v. Woodward, 18 Ala. App. 34, 88 So. 364 (1920)
(charge that jury should not consider change in purchasing value of dollar did
not correctly state the law); Hannon v. Delaware, L. & W. R. t, 98 N. J. L.
191, 119 Atl. 86 (1922) (jury authorized to award compensation and in doing so
to consider the purchasing power of the standard which was used to express it).
'Washington & R. R. Co. v. La Fourcade, 48 App. D. C. 364 (1919) ; Halloran
v. New
England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 AUt. 143 (1921).
"5 Bennett v. Gillette Motor Transport Co., 59 F. Supp. 475 (W. D. Mo. 1944)
(adjudicated cases serve as guideposts) ; Jennings v. Chicago, R.I . & P. Ry., 43 F.
2d 397 (D. Minn. 1930) (keep within bounds of reason and to some extent in
harmony with verdicts in similar cases) ; Szivos v. Leonard, 113 Conn. 522, 155
Atl. 637 (1931); Brook v. Interurban Motor Trans. Co., 156 La. 286, 100 So.
428 (1924); Mississippi R. & L. Co. v. McCormick, 175 Miss. 208, 166 So. 534
(1934) (verdict reduced because far in excess of average verdict for comparable
injury); Garis v. Eberling, 18 Tenn. App. 1, 71 S. W. 2d 215 (1934). But cf.
Dunstan v. Round Hill Dairy, Inc., 128 Conn. 300, 22 A. 2d 631 (1941). See
Notes, 46 A. L. R. 1230 (1927) ; 102 A. L. R. 1125 (1936).
"Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn. 1945);
Reil v. McNaspy, La. -,
177 So. 393 (1937) ; Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
Tulsa v. Black, 186 Okla. 620, 99 P. 2d 891 (1940).
" Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194, 218, 101 S. E. 415,
423 (1919) (". . . while each case must be determined by its own facts, it is
nevertheless true that the verdicts of other juries, which have been approved by
the courts, represent the common or average judgment of mankind as to the
proper recovery in such cases.").
' Kanieski v. Castantini, 243 Mich. 454, 457, 220 N. W. 722, 723 (1928).
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This has been frequently recognized by the courts both in express statements and by constant reference in the opinions to the amounts allowed
in cases of a similar nature.'0
Other courts go further in expressing this view by stating that when
the facts in other cases are similar to the facts in hand, there should
be a reasonable uniformity as to the amount of damages. ° The justification for this rule seems to lie in the leveling of any discriminatory
tendencies on the part of the jury, in enabling the litigants to ascertain
what amount may reasonably be recovered once a cause of action has
been established, and in the promoting of more settlements and compromises out of court.
The practice of resorting to previous cases as a guide to securing
some uniformity in damages would work an injustice without at the
same time considering the decreased value of the dollar. 2 ' Recognizing
this, courts ,use the factor of decreased purchasing value to achieve
practical uniformity with other awards which on a strict "dollar and
cents" basis are at considerable variance with the particular case at
hand. Thus previous decisions considered in conjunction with the
shrinldng dollar afford a guide by which a fair standard of damages for
22
a particular injury may be estimated.
A review of past decisiorls reveals only one judgment in personal
injury cases which approaches that of the principal case in size. In
1946'a jury verdict was sustained awarding $165,000 for loss of both
legs.23 In 1943 $100,000 was allowed as compensation for loss of both
25
legs,24 and in a similar case in 1944 the same award was sustained.
Except for these four verdicts in recent years, the average verdict in
cases where the injury was the loss of both arms or both legs has been
far below $100,000.2 6 Adjustment of the verdicts in twenty-eight such
120 1 PARmrzs, DAMAGE V._DICrS 39 (1927) ; 15 Am. JuR., DAMAGES §207.
Mudrick v. Market Street Ry., 11 Cal. 2d 724, 81 P. 2d 950 (1938);
Hare v. New Amsterdam .Casualty Co., La. App. -,
1 So. 2d 439 (1942) ;
Ford v. Louisville & N. 1. R., Mo. , 196 S. W. 2d 163 (1947);
McNatt v. Wabash Ry., 341 Mo. 516, 108 S.W. 2d 33 (1937).
Hurst v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 280 Mo. 566, 219 S. W. 566 (1920).
E.g., Brown v. Boehn, Cal. 2d -,
178 P. 2d 49 (1947); Cooksey v.
Atchison, T. & S. F." Ry., Cal. 2d - , 178 P. 2d 69 (1947) ; Noyes v. Des
Moines Club, 186 Iowa 378, 170 N. W. 461 (1919) ; Eleazar v. Illinois Cent. R. R.,
La. App. -,
24 So. 2d 387 (1946); Valley v. Scott, 126 Me. 597, 138
AUt. 311 (1927); Rhineberger v. Thompson, Mo. , 202 S. W. 2d 64
(1947); Cook v. Union Electric Supply Co., R. I. -,
133 At. 345 (1926);
National Fruit Product Co. v. Wagner, 185 Va. 38, 37 S.E. 2d 757 (1946) ; Sherrill v.
Olympic Ice Cream Co., 135 Wash. 99, 237 Pac. 14 (1925).
"3 Delaney v. New York Cent. R. R., 68 F. Supp. 70 (S.D. N. Y. 1946)
(considered depreciation of money at the present time).
" Advance v. Thompson, 320 111. App. 406, 51 N. E. 2d 334 (1943) (considered
depreciation
of money in reducing the verdict from $125,000 to $100,000).
"5 McKinney v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R., 57 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. N. Y. 1944)
(reduced
from $130,000).
2
Caldwell v. Southern Pac. Co., 71 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Cal. 1947) ($40,150);
Ellis v. Scandrett, 28 F. Supp. 16 (D. Idaho 1940) ($40,000) ; Dunton v. Hines,
2
2
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cases from 1914 to date to a common base by use of the Department
of Labor statistics on the cost of living reveals that the average amount
of the verdicts so adjusted is approximately $40,000. Further corrected
to the present .day cost of living,2 8 this average adjusted award would

stand at $63,000, an amount some 2Y2 times smaller than the award
sustained. The test of uniformity certainly was not met.
While no statistics are entirely reliable, it would seem that the increased availability and extensiveness of impartial government statistics
would afford a better guide for the adjustment of past verdicts to the
increased cost of living than would the personal observations of the
individual judge. 28' Although the judge in the instant case did refer to
these statistics as justifying the award, he failed to utilize them in a
comparison with other verdicts. The award here sustained through
267 Fed. 452 (D. Me. 1920) ($30,000); Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 197 Ark.

14 121 S. W. 2d 877 (1938) ($45,000); Chicago, R. L & Pac. Ry. v.
Womble, 131 Ark. 411, 199 S. W. 81 (1917) ($25,000); Mudrick v. Market Street
Ry., 11 Cal. 2d 724, 81 P. 2d 950 (1938) ($42,500); 'Howard v. Baltimore &
0. C. T. R. R, 327 Ill. App. 83, 63 N. E. 2d 724 (1945) ($50,000) ; Popp v.
Terminal k. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 316 Ill. App. 670, 45 N. E. 2d 298 (1943)
($45,000) ; Gourle'y v. Chicago & E. I. Ry., 295 Ill. App. 160, 14. N. E. 2d
842 (1938) ($60,000) ; Chicago, I. & L. Ry.. v. Stierwalt, 87 Ind. App. 478,
153 N. E. 807 (1926) ($42,000); Southern Ry. v. Dugless, 169 Ky. 360, 183
S. W. 937 (1916) ($15,000); Nashville, C. & S. R. R. v. Banks, 168 Ky. 579,
182 S.W. 660 (1916) ($16,500) ; Leininger v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 150
La. 1089, 91 So. 521 (1922) ($25,000) ; Prince v. Maine Cent R. R., 122 Me.
130, 119 At. 192 (1922) ($29,965); Carlson v. Payne, 150 Minn. 480, 186 N. W.
291 (1922) ($45,000); McMahon v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 127 Minn. 1, 148
N. W. 446 (1914) ($39,000); Aly v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 342 Mo.
1116 119 S. W. 2d 363 (1938) ($40,000); Turnbow v. Kansas City Rys., 277
Mo. 644, 211 S.W. 41 (1919) ($25,000) ; Fried v. New York N. H. & H. R. R.,
183 App. Div. 115, 170 N. Y. Supp. 697 (1918), aff'd, 230 N. Y. 619, 130
N. E. 917 (1921) ($55,000) ; Moore v. St. Joseph & G. I. Ry., 268 Mo. 31,
186 S.W. 1035 (1916), aff'd, 243 U. S.311 (1916) ($25,000); Palmer v. Security
Trust Co., 242 Mich. 163, 218 N. W. 677 (1928) ($74,000 so excessive as to require a new trial); McKeon v. Delaware L: & W. R. R., 100 N. J. L. 258,
127 Atl. 34 (1924) ($50,000); Beam v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 77 Ohio
App. 419, 68 N. E. 2d 159 (1947) ($75,000); Toledo, C. & 0. R. R. v. Miller,
108 Ohio St.388, 140 N. E. 617 (1923) ($75,000) ; Kurn v. Campbell, 188 Okla.
636, 112 P. 2d 386 (1942) ($25,700); Dumphy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 82
W. 2Va.
123, 95 S.E. 863 (1918) ($30,000).
T
The cases cited notes 24, 25, and 26 supra were those adjusted. Each verdict
was adjusted by dividing the index number of the corresponding year as set out
in the Consumers' Price Index into the amount of the award. By this means the
verdicts may be compared as of a common base at 1935-1936 - 100. See Monthly
Labor Review, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Oct. 1947, p. 510 Table D-1; Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics, 1947 Government Statistics Bureau of Washington, D. C., Consumers' Price Index, pp. 102-103.
"' As of July, 1947.
.8This raises the collateral question of introduction of statistics in the trial
court. In Bell v. First Naiiow- Life Ins. Co., La. App. - , 141 So. 484
(1932), the court, in refusing statistics offered by counsel, said, "We are convinced that we should take judicial cognizance of the fact that there has been an
advance in the purchasing power of money, but cannot accept the figures which
may have been arrived at by -writers in trade journals, particularly when the
reputation and standing of these writers have not been proven nor the journals
offered in evidence.'
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consideration of the decreased purchasing power of the dollar is thus
greatly larger in proportion to other verdicts in similar cases than the
9
increased cost of living would seem to justify.2
ROBERT G. STOCKTON.
Domestic Relations-Parent and Child-Support of
Incompetent Adult
Plaintiff, wife of the defendant, brought suit against him to recover
the value of necessaries and necessary services furnished by her to their
adult son. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant husband had separated
himself from his family, that the son continued to live with the plaintiff,
his mother, before reaching majority and thereafter, and that before
and after attaining majority he was insolvent, unmarried, and so mentally and physically handicapped as to be incapable of supporting himself. On demurrer, held: a good cause of action was stated.'
Under the English and earlier American view, the parent's obligation to support his minor child was a moral one only.2 The prevailing
view in this country now, however, is that there is a legal as well as
moral duty of support resting on the parent.3 While the common law
duty is widely recognized, the basis and reasoning upon which it has
been founded have varied greatly. Some courts have imposed the duty
of support as a reciprocal of the parent's right to the custody, control
and earnings of the minor child ;4 others have found a basis in the in"9The fact that on a previous trial of this same case, reversed on appeal, the
jury awarded only $100,000 would also point to the conclusion that an award of
$160,000 was excessive.
'Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947).
'Mortimer v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 481 (Exch. 1841); Shelton v. Springett, 11
C. B. 452 (1851); Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187 (1870); Freeman v. Robinson,
38 N. J. L. 383, 20 Am. Rep. 399 (1876).
3
AND

1 ScnouzLER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §787 (6th ed. 1921);
DOMESTIC RELATiONS §110 (1931).

MADDEN,

PERSONS

The North Carolina court early recognized a legal duty on the father to maintain his children, even when they had separate estates of their own. Walker v.
Crowder, 37 N. C. 478 (1843) ; Hagler v. McCombs, 66 N. C. 345 (1872). The
duty is not an absolute one, however. It is qualified by the parent's ability.
Casualty Co. v. Lawing, 225 N. C. 103, 33 S. E. 2d 609 (1945).
The duty of support is limited to necessaries, what constitutes necessaries
varying with the circumstances of the particular case. The liability is enforced
under several principles: an agency implied in law, an agency implied in fact,
or quasi-contract, the North Carolina court adopting the latter. See Howell v.
Solomon, 167 N. C. 588, 592, 83 S. E. 619, 621 (1914).
The duty of support is now generally covered by criminal statutes also. See
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§14-322 through 14-325..
' Central Asylum v. Knighton, 113 Ky. 156, 67 S. W. 366 (1902) ; Dedham v.
Natick, 16 Mass. 140 (1819); Fulton v. Fulton, 52 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 729
(1895); Butler v. Commonvealth, 132 Va. 609, 110 S. E. 868 (1922). Right to
custody and earnings does not form a satisfactory basis for the duty, however,
since the duty of support must still remain on the father even though custody of the
child has been awarded the mother or third persons. Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md.
254, 67 Atl. 132 (1907); see Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N. C. 319, 83 S. E. 490,
491 (1914).

